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1Making sense of the evolving nature of depression narratives and their 
inherent conflicts 
Abstract
Originally a psychiatric diagnosis fashioned by Western psychiatry in the 20th 
Century, depression evolved to encompass varying lineages of discourse and care. 
This article elucidates some of the current challenges – as well as emerging 
discourses – influencing the category of depression. Depression-like experiences are 
shaped by (at times conflicting) subjectivities, claims to knowledge, material realities, 
social contexts and access to resources. With no unified understanding of the 
category of ‘depression’ available, lay people, social and neuro scientists, GPs, 
psychiatrists, talking therapists and pharmaceutical companies all attempt to shape 
narratives of depression. The current paper focuses on patient narratives about 
depression – in the context of these wider debates – to better elucidate the ways in 
which depression discourses are publically developing along varying lines. In 
conclusion, the paper suggests that we could better conceptualise the resulting 
‘depression(s)’ with concepts such as ‘society of mind’ and notions of subjectivity 
unbounded by individuals.
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Introduction
A dominant paradigm in psychiatry is that discoveries are made in the basic 
sciences, and then flow through to inform practice and applied research (Priebe, 
Burns and Craig 2013). Here, genetics and neurobiology are assumed to explain 
mental illness, rather than contribute to our understanding of complex mental 
conditions. Western psychiatry has been powerful in shaping mental illness 
constructions. However, from the second half of the 20th Century the focus on 
diagnoses and the role of biology meant that a deeper understanding of patient 
subjectivities and contexts (and the implications for alleviating suffering) has not 
always been high on the agenda (Cooksey and Brown 1998). Despite the 
ascendency of biological explanations for depression (Lebowitz and Ahn 2015), new 
pharmaceutical treatment advances have stalled in the modern era, while the 
“evidence of the importance of personal relationships in shaping both cause and 
cure” (p. 320) of mental conditions has continued to accumulate (Priebe, Burns and 
Craig 2013). Critical social scientists have long argued that it is only through focusing 
on subjectivities, social relations and contexts (e.g. childhood attachments, trauma, 
poverty, gender relations), and not just neuroscience and genetics, that the 
formation, texture and experience (and amelioration) of mental health problems 
could be better understood (Cooper 2004; Pilgrim, Rogers and Bentall 2009; Rogers 
and Pilgrim 2014). In the area of depression, the National Institute for Health & Care 
Excellence (NICE) in England has highlighted the importance of meaning-making 
research, noting that a “wide range of biological, psychological and social factors, 
3which are not captured well by current diagnostic systems, have a significant impact 
on the course of depression and the response to treatment” (p. 6)  (NICE 2009). As 
diagnosis is not a reliable guide to treatment, the requirement for psychiatric 
nosologies to better encompass complex interactions of genetics, neuroscience, and 
wider psycho-social issues has been emphasised (Cuthbert and Insel 2013).
While critical social scientists note that too much emphasis has been placed on 
diagnosis and biology, we are yet to develop alternative narratives about depression 
that could capture the public imagination in the way that the ‘chemical imbalance’ 
hypothesis continues to. There are striking candidates for better stories; it is known, 
for instance, that the brain maintains neuroplasticity into adulthood, that 
psychotherapy can lead to neural changes, and the environment itself influences 
genetic expression (Lebowitz and Ahn 2015). This narrative of ‘multi-directional 
traffic’ between the biological and the social has the potential to challenge the 
imbalance story. Applied to diagnoses like schizophrenia, for example, the issues 
include ongoing questions about the coherency of the diagnosis and 
inconclusiveness about biological bases. Here, there are endeavours to find 
alternative ways of framing the problem, such as by focusing biopsychosocial 
investigations on homogenous experiences like voice hearing instead of complex 
psychiatric constructions (Cromby 2016), or the ways in which trauma (a history of 
childhood abuse specifically) can powerfully shape biology and social experiences 
(Janssen et al. 2004). The newer multi-directional understanding of mental health 
has compelled scholars to plead for greater balance in the face of the “increasing 
dominance of a biological approach to mental health problems” (p. S460) 
(Kinderman, Pini and Wooley 2017).
4Approach to analysis
In this paper, the argument put forward is for an approach to depression that better 
contends with the (frequently) competing claims made about this particular kind of 
distress. The paper’s analysis is situated in debates about depression in the wider 
literature. In particular, it draws on patient narratives of depression collected and 
analysed via a number of studies that were conducted using the scholarly methods 
developed by the Health Experience Research Group (HERG) at Oxford University 
(Ziebland & Hunt 2014). Participants were all recruited into studies either via health 
practitioners and other networks (e.g. mental health charities). Each study aimed to 
capture a wide range of variation in experiences (e.g. treatment approaches, severity 
of depression) and socio-demographics (e.g. gender, age, ethnicity). Participants’ 
ages ranged between 18 and 84 years, all but a few of whom had been diagnosed 
with depression by a medical doctor and/or had been prescribed antidepressants. 
Most interviews were conducted with people at the more severe end of depression, 
and included participants with multiple episodes over their lifetimes, many times 
requiring hospital admission. Interviews were mainly conducted in people’s own 
homes, although venues could also include workplaces, universities, library rooms 
and hotels. Participant depression narratives were retrospective in that people were 
not suffering from debilitating depression at the time of interview. Participants were 
initially asked about their experiences of living with depression and/or using 
antidepressants via interviews that elicited personal narratives as a way of providing 
rich data (Hollway and Jefferson 1997), beginning before depression 
onset/antidepressant use through to the current day. Additional questions relevant to 
the study were also asked at the end of the interview if not already covered, for 
5example about recovery. Interviews averaged around 2 hours in length. All 
interviews were conducted by experienced researchers, were recorded, transcribed 
verbatim by professional transcribers, and returned to participants for checking, 
correction and comment. The approach to analysis was thematic in nature (Braun 
and Clarke 2006), using constant comparison techniques to ensure rigour (Dye et al. 
2000), and incorporating concepts from the literature to help develop and clarify 
analyses, i.e. a modified constant comparison approach (Lomas et al. 2013).
Biology and widening constructions of depression
Stories about biologically determined depression are presented to the public with 
ever greater conviction. At the time of writing this paper, the immune system is being 
presented as a new potential culprit for depression  (Gallagher, Buchanan and Luck-
Baker 2016). While the public are encouraged to share in this ‘cutting edge science’ 
(p. 109) (e.g. via the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)), dissenting views are 
conspicuous by their absence (Morgan 2017). One idea put forward by the 
proponents of the immune hypothesis is that inflammatory chemicals enter the brain 
from the body and cause depression, perhaps by interfering with serotonin levels 
(McInnes 2014). A problem with this story is that the serotonin deficiency causal 
hypothesis for depression has a significant credibility problem, as outlined below. 
Nevertheless, the inflammation argument breathes new life to an old chemical 
imbalance story, while reconfiguring the body and subjectivity in new ways. Consider 
also that a causal link between endogenous opiates and depression has been 
hypothesised, on the basis that people with depression can ‘feel better’ when taking 
opiates (Fava et al. 2016). However, as the current paper (and others) argue (for 
example, see Trivelli (2014)), biology, personal narratives, and political contexts 
6converge to create depression stories that are nevertheless signified by their real 
world consequences, even if they remain somewhat elusive and disparate. If we 
allow the story about biological determinism to unfairly dominate the field, then so 
too do we promote a level of pessimism about the prospect of gaining personal 
mastery over depression, a biologically determined condition in need of a 
pharmaceutical fix, not social interventions (Lebowitz & Ahn, 2017).
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) of  the American 
Psychiatric Association (APA)  has been widely used by psychiatrists to diagnose 
depression  since the second half of the 20th Century. The manual was (and 
remains) a shifting political as much as scientific document, fashioned out of the 
defeat of psychoanalysis by bio-psychiatry in the mid 20th Century (McPherson and 
Armstrong 2006; Pilgrim 2007). Earlier notions of melancholia were opaque and not 
a close match for depression; not that is, until the 19th Century, when melancholia 
moved closer to our modern understanding of mood disorders (Berrios 1988). From 
the 1950s onwards, various ways of classifying depression (e.g. once called 
‘endogenous’ and ‘reactive’ depressions, then ‘major’ and ‘minor’ depression from 
the early 1980s), proliferated in medical journal citations, influenced by categories 
made available in successive editions of the DSM (McPherson and Armstrong 2006). 
It was, however, major depression that captured the 20th Century mood, becoming a 
highly successful franchise for the APA (not to mention for the pharmaceutical 
industry that historically was at pains to nurture close links to the scientific panel 
responsible for developing the DSM) (Cosgrove et al. 2006). So much so, that by 
2012, the World Health Organization announced that depression had become the 
7leading cause of disability worldwide, affecting 350 million people at any one time 
(WHO 2012).
However, if depression is socially produced, and dependent on forms of power and 
influence as argued above, then it is useful for us to focus our attention on the real 
world laboratory, involving claims and counter-claims about depression by patients, 
scientists, health professionals, the pharmaceutical industry and so on (Latour 2004; 
Priebe, Burns and Craig 2013). Depression screening or diagnosis involves 
clinicians considering a descriptive list of symptoms (e.g. low mood, loss of interest) 
to ensure the right - and sufficient numbers of - symptoms are present for enough 
time, while ruling out other diagnoses (Kessler et al. 1996). This apparently 
systematic approach covers over some peculiarities about depression. One issue is 
that no one can say with any authority what depression actually is (nor other mental 
health diagnoses for that matter); neither those that experience it, nor those that 
investigate it (Trivelli 2014). One cognitive neuroscientist (well known for) 
investigating neuro-psycho-pharmacological underpinnings of depression and 
anxiety (Oliver Robinson) put it this way, “I literally have no idea [what depression is]” 
(online)  (Shariatmadari 2015).
Another key issue with depression is that lay people now actively deploy depression 
discourses in ways that psychiatry could not have anticipated in the 20th Century 
(McPherson and Armstrong 2009). Less than half of the 350 million people who 
experience depression globally receive treatment (WHO 2012); many go 
undiagnosed, or self-diagnose (e.g. via the Internet) (Ryan and Wilson 2008). Not 
surprisingly then, people are adept at appropriating depression discourses (Epstein 
8et al. 2010). One study, for example, found that people can deploy the language of 
depression as a “precise kind of political affect” (p. 333), experienced in 
circumstances of austerity and the production of workers for the needs of capitalism 
(Stern and Brown 2016). Here, participants must work out how to self-medicate 
and/or find meaning out of situations that generally inspire hopelessness. 
Alternatively, depression can become a repository for all the difficult emotions that 
society says are not acceptable and should be remedied (Dowrick and Frances 
2013). Not surprisingly, these generative, multiple threads of depression(s) are 
inadequately captured and dealt with by authorities. In terms of treatment, 
antidepressant prescription (the main treatment for depression) without any other 
ongoing personal support, can easily spawn patients who resist authority (Anderson 
et al. 2015). Or as 27-year-old Nicole put it, “I think taking medication is something I 
really struggled with because I didn't want to take it. I didn't want to—you know, I 
thought I could just get better on my own.” Thus, attempts to medically delineate and 
treat depression are inevitably doomed to perpetual challenge, if not failure.
In many cases the medical profession themselves frequently assist patients 
diagnosed with depression to develop alternative stories about their condition. For 
example, many general practitioners (GPs) work to de-medicalise the stories 
presented by their patients, instead promoting notions of the condition as only 
knowable in social context (Kokanovic et al. 2010), e.g. as a signifier for life’s hidden 
problems and inequalities their patients must face (Körner et al. 2011). For ‘difficult’ 
patients, doctors may de-medicalise the condition in other ways, such as drawing on 
lay ideas of social deviance to signify patients they experience as particularly 
unpleasant (McPherson and Armstrong 2009). The condition can be taken in other 
9non-DSM directions too. Psychoanalysts, for example, frequently construct 
depression as a defence against less conscious thoughts and feelings that threaten 
to overwhelm the individual, either interpersonal (e.g. due to feelings of 
abandonment) or via a punishing internal self-critic (as voices internalised from past 
harsh authority figures) (Blatt 1998).
Questions can also be raised about depression as a Westernised construct. In some 
parts of China, for example, concepts of depression and emotions are resisted, and 
depression-like experiences are apprehended through the lived body, as a 
discomfort, an inner pressure or bodily pain, rather than psychologically (Kleinman 
and Good 1985). However, a close reading of patient accounts of depression in the 
West shows the condition is embodied in interesting ways here too (Ridge 2009). For 
one male participant, the onset of depression was described as, “I have this sort of 
pressure around my brain, you know I feel that someone’s got their hands inside 
there.” While for another, depression was heralded by a change in her voice, among 
other wide-ranging physical manifestations:  “… I can’t sing any more, I love singing 
to music in the car or in the kitchen. My… you can hear from my voice, it completely 
changes. I think my, also my posture changes I think, I suspect. And I can’t describe 
the physical changes. They, they, it’s as if, you know, there’s a whole sweeping 
change inside my body. It’s very difficult to describe what it is. The most noticeable is 
my voice.” Some of these somatic accounts read more like a bodily change, 
invasion, or possession (a belief system common in some societies, including parts 
of China (Kua, Chew and Ko 1993)), with the symptoms of depression as outlined in 
the DSM underplayed in such accounts.
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Understanding the different ways in which depression-like experiences are narrated 
is key to assisting the broadest range of people to recover (Ridge and Ziebland 
2006). While reification of depression as a disease entity(ies) helps some people 
(e.g. by giving a label for their condition), others find this approach less helpful, or 
may not think about their depression-like issues in mental health terms at all, but 
rather as “struggling with life” (p. 204) (Lomas et al. 2013). What most participants in 
our studies seem to have in common though is the ability to piece together a more or 
less useful story about their experiences in retrospect, frequently characterized (at 
least initially) by halting narratives, lack of vocabulary, disconnected feelings, 
problems with self-knowing, and perplexing bodily sensations (Ridge 2009). 
Veronica, for example, described how she found herself alarmingly cut off from 
herself and her family, where she could only remember that she loved them and was 
loved herself: “I couldn't feel anything at all. My emotions were completely dead. And 
I was just very frightened.”
In examining so called ‘depression’, there are limitations introduced by creating a 
binary with the biological by splitting the body off, or limiting ourselves to DSM 
descriptions, or professional constructions available in the UK’s publically funded 
‘National Health Service’ (NHS). Antidepressants are a case in point. 
Antidepressants, whose legitimacy is questioned by a wide variety of patients as 
indicated above (Anderson et al. 2015), not to mention scholars (Buus 2014),  are 
nevertheless are increasingly popular medical prescriptions (Spence et al. 2014). 
Additionally, they are reported by our participants to generate traffic between biology 
and subjectivity. Thus, counter-narratives are possible, whereby some users 
challenge folklore about antidepressants creating ‘fake’ selves and feelings. The 
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counter claims are that the medication allows people to get in touch with their 
authenticity (e.g. “Sertraline [is] a bit like Berocca, it’s you on a good day”), or helps 
people get to the heart of the problem causing their depression (Ridge et al. 2015), 
e.g. “the tablets have helped the sort of underlying cause that has allowed me to 
embrace the CBT  [Cognitive Behavioural Therapy].”  Thus, subjectivity can usefully 
be re-worked biochemically in this view (Fraser 2001).
Bad Chemistry: Chemical imbalance narratives
Persistent ideas that antidepressants correct chemical imbalances need to be 
challenged (Middleton and Moncrieff 2011), and it should be noted from the outset 
that the claimed efficacy of antidepressants is disputed. Some work has showed that 
antidepressants do not have advantages over placebos (Moncrieff and Kirsch 2005). 
However, the placebo effect is known to be substantial in its own right (Foot and 
Ridge 2012), and antidepressants would need to be significantly better than the 
placebo effect for a positive randomised control trial (RCT) result.  Additionally, the 
privileging of RCTs is known to side-line other forms of evidence of patient benefit, 
including patient accounts (Victora, Habicht and Bryce 2004). On balance, more 
recent research has found that antidepressants do have an effect above and beyond 
the placebo effect in RCTs, but their benefits are limited (Cipriani et al. 2018; Kirsch 
et al. 2008).
One problem with common antidepressants (selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors 
– SSRIs – specifically) is that the once frequent assertion that they help depression 
by correcting a chemical imbalance (specifically a lack of serotonin) never had 
specific support in the scientific literature (Lacasse and Leo 2005). This narrative, 
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however, was a successful selling point for the pharmaceutical industry, capturing 
the public imagination as fact. The story also gave health professionals an easy way 
to explain antidepressants to patients, while promoting antidepressants as a logical 
(and relatively cheap) treatment for depression (Healy 2015).  Mischievous 
researchers once asked journalists who had publically claimed that depression was 
caused by a chemical imbalance to provide evidence to back up their claims, which 
of course no one could do (Leo and Lacasse 2008). At the same time, the metaphor 
(once widely proclaimed) that taking antidepressants for depression was akin to 
taking insulin to correct for diabetes was increasingly questioned by both patients 
and their health professionals (McMullen and Sigurdson 2014). As mysteriously as it 
appeared, the chemical imbalance story was retired from public life. Pharmaceutical 
companies subsequently replaced their chemical imbalance stories with more 
evidence-based claims about the pharmaceuticals ‘adjusting’ neurotransmitters 
(Lacasse and Leo 2015).
Nevertheless, the chemical imbalance story had already resonated with the public, 
and was widely adopted to make sense of lives: Patients could not discard it as 
easily as the pharmaceutical industry. Nevertheless, there was a defiance and 
defensiveness surrounding the use of the story by patients. While not necessarily 
responding to such nuanced scientific debates as outlined above, Mathew’s defiance 
underpins the extent to which he understands that the legitimacy of his beliefs is 
contested:
I mean it’s [depression] chemical, you know I’m quite, you know I’m quite 
happy to admit there’s something screwed up about my brain chemistry, you 
know. But you know, some people are diabetic, they take drugs, you know. 
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And I know people say, “Oh, it’s not the same.” But I’m afraid it bloody well is! 
[Mathew]
As intimated above, the chemical imbalance story clashes with an optimistic (and 
another institutionalised) narrative about the possibility of recovering from 
depression: How can you recover from a chemical imbalance in your brain? 
Chemical imbalance narratives sit alongside more hopeful recovery narratives 
fashioned out of 20th Century psychiatric deinstitutionalisation and the psychoactive 
pharmaceutical revolution (Braslow 2013). Recovery is commonly touted as being 
about “building a meaningful and satisfying life, as defined by the person 
themselves, whether or not there are ongoing or recurring symptoms or problems” 
(p. ii) (Shepherd, Boardman and Slade 2008). However, the recovery movement is 
not without its critics, and some argue that recovery moved away from person-
centred definitions to become co-opted by health services and governments in ways 
that ended up disempowering patients (Gordon 2013). Davidson and colleagues 
(2005) for example, consider the professional take on recovery (e.g. alleviating 
symptoms and measuring outcomes) as being at odds with the agenda of patients, 
including the importance of consumer-led movements in challenging the status quo.
While unhelpful chemical imbalance stories about mental health have particular 
veracity, they can cancel out competing claims about depression. David, for 
example, casually dropped into his story a traumatic childhood experience which 
appeared particularly salient in explaining his later experiences of recurrent 
depression. However, he quickly disregarded his highly traumatic experience for a 
chemical imbalance story:
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And we got very nearly bombed… About two hundred yards from the bottom 
of the garden was an airfield, well the airfield that's still there, and the 
Germans came and dropped bombs that close. My brother and I witnessed an 
eighty-eight machine gunning the harvesters out in the field, the men were 
out, harvesting the crops with the horses and carts and a plane came along 
and machine gunned them… I think you get it (depression) or you don't, at 
some time your chemicals get mixed up and that's it. You get one, a lack of 
one chemical, and you get an imbalance and there it starts. 
[David]
People who experience depression are frequently encouraged to close down deeper 
examination of (and not coincidently more emotionally difficult) issues underpinning 
their condition (Dowrick 2004). And the chemical imbalance narrative also means 
that people who feel that antidepressants ‘complete them’ may feel justified in 
staying on the medication permanently, even if the weight of evidence suggests that 
they might be better off discontinuing their medication (Kendrick 2015), a daunting 
prospect for many people. There are the embodied and psychological effects of 
‘discontinuation syndrome’ (Tamam and Ozpoyraz 2002), which can be dramatic and 
highly alarming (for example, from our research, “…so every so often it's like you get 
an electric shock in your tongue, it was just awful.  I had the shakes, I had dry mouth, 
it was just horrendous…). Additionally, people are many times very fearful of 
depression returning:
And so, I feel well, and for the next four and a half years from now I am quite 
safe. I can still continue taking that [antidepressants]. But in five years time, 
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do I have to go back [to the GP] and sort of plead my case again? Ask as it 
were if I can continue taking them? Or do I have to go back through that 
misery of feeling that it’s all going pear shaped again… [Liza]
Coming off long-term antidepressant use may also mean challenging the power of 
the chemical imbalance story. While research suggests that people are conflicted 
about the chemical imbalance narrative (Ridge 2009), the reality is that there is little 
by the way of health resources available in the UK to help people sort through the 
personal issues contributing to their depression and antidepressant use. According 
to the Chief Medical Officer, 3 in 4 people receive no treatment at all for their mental 
illness in England (Davis 2014). When treatment is sought and available, 
antidepressants are more convenient and cheaper than other forms of treatment 
(McCarthy 2013). However, the legitimacy – and morality – of antidepressant use is 
questioned by users themselves (not to mention the wider public). This is especially 
the case where people experience psychoactive, ‘pseudo-illicit’ effects from their 
medication, such as feeling high (Ridge et al. 2015), e.g. “Certainly with the 
amitriptyline I felt very much on a chemical high... buzzing round the ceiling.” So 
powerful are moral concerns surrounding antidepressant use, even those who 
strongly argue against such interpretations must engage with illegitimacy narratives 
at some level. While there were many accounts of moral dilemma-free medication 
narratives, they were constructed in opposition to assumptions of illegitimacy, thus 
inadvertently reinforcing moral storylines. Thus, in trying to defend antidepressants, 
one participant ended up highlighting the clandestine nature of the medication and 
pseudo-illicitness (anonymous 2015): “Actually I just don’t see any bad in them other 
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than potentially the stigma… you don’t have to share it with the world, you can do it 
yourself, it’s a tiny little pill that you take and nobody ever needs to know about [it].”
Re-writing depression narratives
Instead of focusing on DSM endorsed symptoms (Lewis 1995), people attempt to 
make sense of their own personal experiences of depression, often using metaphors 
or ideas already available in the wider culture. Here, hellishness and feeling cut-off 
from others are very common accounts, e.g. “It is like rotting in the depths of hell”, or 
“It was like being inside a very, very thick balloon and no matter how hard I pushed 
out, the momentum of the skin of the balloon would just push me back in.” 
Navigating such difficult interior landscapes were key to coping with – and integrating 
– depressive experiences  (Ridge 2009). Craig, for example, found that Vodka could 
temporarily lift him up and provide breathing space from the hellishness of his 
experience. For Pamela, her experience of depression was strongly accompanied 
with feeling like the black sheep of her family. It was only through a chance viewing 
of a documentary on dyslexia that she had the sudden realization that dyslexia was 
the key to her depression. Her feeling (with her ‘clever’ family reinforcing the idea) 
was that she was somehow inferior, and harsh self-reproach followed:
I firmly believe that my depression came from the dyslexia… The person that 
did the [dyslexia] assessment said, “You’ve actually got a very high IQ.” And 
the joy of knowing that I had a problem, what my problem was, alongside the 
sorrow of all those missed opportunities… [Pamela]
Like Pamela quoted above, better dealing with depression variously involved gaining 
personal insights and telling a more useful story about themselves (e.g. dispensing 
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with self-blame); adopting  more hopeful ‘recovery’ attitudes (e.g. in the very depths 
of hell, one man felt joy because he knew at some point he would be lifted up); using 
‘recovery tools’ (talking therapies were very commonly endorsed as useful); creating 
a space to experience and nurture personal insights; needing to engage with 
subjectivity ‘authentically’; coming to terms with a ‘false self’ which frequently 
emerged in early life to cope with the agendas of others; and variously re-writing the 
story about depression as being less detrimental than previously understood (e.g. as 
a necessary wake-up call, a spiritual awakening) (Ridge and Ziebland 2006).
Our research also uncovered a new strand of depression discourse, where ‘coming 
out’ for those with depression (and as part of recovery) shared the language and 
tasks that sexual minorities have talked about following the advent of gay liberation 
(Ridge and Ziebland 2012).  Similar to the stories of sexual minorities, stories about 
long-term and recurrent depression shared common milestones, including feeling 
vaguely different as a child; the need to accept or reject the label of depression; 
recasting depression as commonplace or advantageous (and not just as 
detrimental); needing to network with those who have had similar experiences; and 
contending with feelings of shame through to pride in terms of their depression; 
coming out of the depression ‘closet’ and even publically (sometimes militantly) 
challenging the stigma associated with depression, or as Ruth said, for example, “… 
explode it [stigma] whenever you can I say, but I’ve been very out because I’ve 
campaigned a lot on this…”. 
In another strand of depression storytelling, our analysis found that depression for 
men could be re-constructed in gendered terms, as involving a re-assertion of 
masculinity (Emslie et al. 2006), frequently by re-casting depression as a heroic 
18
battle (as opposed to a potentially feminizing condition). So one man described 
depression as an opponent, where he had to find a level of anger within himself to 
wrestle with this experience: 
..,you’ve …got to sort of reach down and... somehow find the strength deep 
down to start putting it into motion. It’ s really weird. I got really, really angry at 
the depression... it was as if I was treating it as a person now... I just thought 
to myself ‘No, you are just not going to do this to me. You know, you are not 
going to have this control that you’ve had over me for the last two years. .. I’m 
going to, you know, pull myself out of this’. [Patrick]
Less commonly, men challenged hegemonic masculinity in their re-telling of 
experiences of depression, for example, by highlighting the intrinsic value of their 
sensitivity and creativity (that might also predispose them to depression). As Paul put 
it, after a lifetime of experience with depression, “…I felt I was missing something. I 
didn’t have something that the rest of the human race had. But in fact, it turned out 
almost to be the opposite. That in fact, you know we [with depression] have a certain 
sensitivity, I think.”
A final strand of the depression narrative is silence. There is some evidence that 
psychodynamic or psychoanalytic approaches can help to alleviate depression 
(Driessen et al. 2010; Knekt et al. 2008). Here, the development of a constructive 
therapist-client relationship which allows a re-working of past relational injuries is 
thought to be important (Milton 2001). The hope in such therapy approaches is that 
the client internalizes the helpful functions of the therapist (e.g. a non-judgmental 
approach to the self as apposed to a self-critical inner voice) (Gabbard 2010). The 
19
most recent trial in the NHS showed that 44% of patients with treatment resistant 
depression, receiving long-term psychoanalytic psychotherapy (LTPP), could no 
longer be classified as having major depression at 2 years post-treatment follow-up 
(thus treatment benefits continued long after treatment stopped), compared with 10% 
of those patients receiving treatment as usual (Fonagy et al. 2015). Despite these 
encouraging findings, qualitative research into depression tends to fall silent just 
where the unconscious world of psychotherapy starts. Thus, where psychoanalysts 
might – through painstaking work with clients – conclude that an earlier formed fear 
of abandonment contributes to episodes of depression (and thus guides the 
treatment approach) (Blatt 1998), narrative research itself rarely (if ever) highlights 
abandonment as an explanatory framework for depression. Yet these less 
conscious, early experiences could help to shed light on amelioration of suffering 
(Cooper 2004; Pilgrim, Rogers and Bentall 2009). Certainly, our participants who 
were fortunate enough to access talking therapies were generally upbeat about their 
treatments, even if their access was limited to short-term courses. One participant – 
who was fortunate enough to secure longer-term therapy – highlighted how complex 
the process of piecing together a narrative supporting her return from depression 
was:
It’s like you can’t sum it up in a sentence, what’s the matter . . . you know. I’ve 
just spent a year in therapy and I still don’t really . . . haven’t got to the bottom 
of what’s the matter with me. It takes time, you know. It takes discovery and it 
takes courage and it takes persistence and energy. [Belinda]
Broken depression narratives
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Depression involves distinctive regimes and lineages of care in the UK, commonly 
involving no treatment, or antidepressant medication at best, or a waiting list for 
talking therapies for the fortunate (increasingly short-term cognitive behavioural 
therapy (CBT) is offered in the UK, through the Increasing Access to Psychological 
Therapies (IAPTs) programme on the NHS (Clark 2011)). Depression is also a term 
– and area of practice – that has been traditionally shaped by Western psychiatry. 
Yet, as outlined in this paper, depression is now interpreted via (sometimes 
incompatible) frameworks, on the part of lay people and different professionals. Our 
brief excursion through the varying constructions of depression suggests that people 
are actively coopting and pioneering different discourses as they recount depression-
like experiences. As the construction and contestation of depression continues to 
unfold, the most recent DSM (5th Edition) also met with controversy, for example, 
having been criticized for re-classifying grieving as potentially part of major 
depression (Wakefield and First 2012). This move by the APA was cited as an 
instance of unhelpfully medicalizing suffering through the expansion of a medical 
remit (Dowrick and Frances 2013).
Examining these kinds of instabilities and multiple, generative strands of narrative 
offer rich opportunities for us to re-think depression. From our brief exploration, 
patient and professional narratives tend to employ different rubrics to psychiatry 
classification systems, relying on metaphors to describe experiences that are difficult 
or impossible to otherwise articulate. Different kinds of patients and professionals tell 
different stories about the origins, qualities and potential treatments of depressions. 
Given this climate of diversity and disjuncture, and the relative lack of treatment 
availability (although many treatments have some evidence to support them), it is to 
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be expected that lay people will self-diagnose and self-define/manage their 
depression  (Ridge and Ziebland 2006). As argued above, a diagnosis of depression 
does not necessarily tell us all that much about the nature of the suffering. 
Nevertheless, a diagnosis of depression can be valued by patients for the way it 
affords a level of recognition:
… you can give someone tablets and [they] go away… And I think I could have 
benefited from that [depression] being recognised an awful lot earlier. I feel like 
I’ve almost lost twenty years of my life by that not being diagnosed. [Rosey]
This paper also explored some ambiguities in current qualitative research into 
depression. For example, there is some disconnection between ideas generated in 
psychotherapy with patients who experience depression, and those that emerge 
from social science research about patient experiences. Some privileged research 
participants who have had access to long-term therapy (but as one of our 
participants noted, she had to ‘fight’ to get it on the NHS), are able to articulate the 
ways in which they valued therapy. In reality, most patients in the UK will only have 
access to antidepressant medication, and perhaps CBT after a relatively long waiting 
time. Participants can be positive about CBT on the NHS, although not always 
(Ridge 2009). And while CBT is useful to many people and has an evidence-base, 
for other patients, it does not begin to reach their particular kind of suffering (Rizq 
2012). Additionally, some research suggests that trials of CBT for depression have 
revealed a steady decline in effectiveness from the original trials beginning in the late 
70s (Johnsen and Friborg 2015), perhaps related to the expansion of services with 
less skilled practitioners than those originally trained in CBT.
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Conclusion
The current paper outlined how depression is being actively contructed along 
multiple, fragmented lines. At least initially, constructions of the category were 
heavily influenced by medical authorities. Today, however, there are increasing 
claims and counterclaims generated about depression and treatment, many of which 
are difficult to reconcile. For instance, this paper outlined how new discourses about 
depression emerge from the effects of neoliberal austerity policies, and the 
masculinised (re)construction of depression as a heroic journey rather than an 
especially feminised complaint. Nevertheless, there are interdisciplinary debates 
which can help shed light on varying depression constructions. Blackman (2014), for 
example, focuses on the way in which ‘contagion’ of ideas works in networks, 
arguing that hitherto neglected topics in science such as ‘suggestion’ can help 
elucidate the affective processes going on in such areas. Blackman deployed the 
Derridian concept of ‘hauntology’ (as something erased yet still palpably present) to 
explore what could have been if Western psychological experimentation had retained 
its historical focus on “the processual, indeterminate, entangled technical-material 
affective agencies that cannot be reduced to psychological capacities relating to 
distinctly bounded human subjects.” (p. 368) Thus, claims about the unconscious, 
transmission of ideas, and odd experiences sidelined in current depression 
discussions (e.g. changes in voice tone, or of a hand reaching into the brain, or of 
embodied changes in the body) could become more central to our investigations of 
depression.
Despite the apparent birth of depression via the 20th Century DSM, the splintering - 
and lack of connectedness - of ideas about depression remains the current state of 
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play. Furthermore, it does not always seem useful to try and cobble together a 
coherent or definitive account of depression from these threads. Instead, there are 
apparent developments and assemblages of claims and ideas, and silences around 
other issues, that may be worth examining. According to Hermans (2013) it is 
possible to view the participants in such debates relationally, as ‘dialogical selves’ 
functioning “as a part whole; as a society of mind with tensions, conflicts, and 
oppositions … The voices of other individuals, the collective voices of groups, and 
even the power games of societal institutions enter the self-space of the individual 
and challenge the self to give an answer. Along these lines, a self emerges in which 
different voices agree or disagree with each other, lead to unification or opposition, 
and are involved in relations of power and counter-power.” (p. 149-150). Here, the 
claims to power, multiple voices and experiences are a product of relationships that 
extend back and forth between the bounded human subject, society, the 
unconscious and objects therein. Thus, for example, electroconvulsive therapy 
(ECT) for severe depression not only must consider issues of efficacy, but factor in 
lay memories about how health professional conduct themselves; the echoes of 
human traumas from the past, and the non-human artifacts (e.g. the experience of 
having the anaesthetic administered and other rituals surrounding the procedure) 
that powerfully shaped treatment recollections and perceptions of benefit (Knight et 
al. 2017). Resonating with memories and collective experiences, these human and 
non-human factors combined to determine whether ECT is experienced as a further 
trauma (e.g. “I’ve used the word ‘abuse,’ it [is] like another, but a mental abuse.”), or 
alternatively, as a comforting (if not always effective) treatment (e.g. “[ECT is my] still 
point in a turning world”). Thus, as Blackman (2014) argues, the role of non-human 
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agents, and the things we might have erased, can usefully be considered alongside 
the (frequently unbounded) forces that shape subjectivities.
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